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What and how do they eat? Most 
species are thought to be carnivorous 
grazers, feeding on sponges, 
cnidaria or even molluscs. Abyssal 
pycnogonids have been observed in 
association with anemones at whale- 
and wood-fall sites on the sea bed 
(Figure 2). They can both walk and 
swim, although walking is extremely 
slow. Some species ‘swim’ by tucking 
up their legs and allowing themselves 
to sink rapidly, others beat their legs. 
Tidal species can sense changes in 
water pressure and alternate between 
swimming and walking accordingly. 
Because they do not have a planktonic 
larval phase, they do not disperse far, 
although at least one shallow-water 
species may show seasonal migration 
into deeper water. 
When did they first appear? There 
are very few pycnogonids in the fossil 
record. The earliest apparent sea spider 
is a larva found among the exquisitely 
preserved Upper Cambrian “Orsten” 
deposits from around 500 million years 
ago. A later, adult sea spider has been 
found in the Silurian (425 million years 
ago), and others have been reported in 
the Devonian and the Jurassic. Some of 
the Devonian specimens are relatively 
primitive and retain a tail.
What is the future? Final resolution of 
their phylogenetic position will require 
substantial amounts of morphological 
and DNA data from a wide range of 
species. This will not only resolve 
one of the thorniest questions in 
evolutionary biology, it will also open 
the door to functional studies of these 
enigmatic and bizarre animals.
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mode of processing, the function of 
which is to extract parameters that 
are relevant to action, and to generate 
the corresponding motor commands” 
(p. 320), as opposed to “‘semantic’ 
analysis [which is] performed in the 
temporal lobe” (p.314) [3]. Thus, the 
meaning of objects is not coded in F5, 
although clearly, “the semantic system 
can influence the pragmatic system” 
(p. 320) [3] (for example, we want to 
reach for food not snakes).
Mirror neurons were discovered 
within this same circuit and found to 
have similar sensorimotor properties 
[1,4]. It was even suggested that 
“the actions performed by other 
monkeys must be a very important 
factor in determining action selection” 
(p. 179) [4] and that “the [motor] 
vocabulary of F5 can be addressed in 
two ways: by objects and by events 
[actions]” (p. 317) [3]. Thus, the 
theoretical and empirical pieces were 
in place to interpret mirror neurons 
as sensorimotor association cells 
relevant to action selection, just like 
object-oriented cells (Figure 1).  
But this interpretation was not 
considered — why?
It was the mirroring property 
of mirror neurons that steered 
investigators away from a 
straightforward sensorimotor 
interpretation. The logic was, if mirror 
actions (for example, imitation) are not 
in the species’ repertoire, then mirror 
neurons can have no motor selection 
function. Rizzolatti and Craighero 
used this argument, pitting “two main 
hypotheses” of mirror neuron function, 
imitation and action understanding; 
because macaques do not imitate, 
they argued, mirror neurons must 
support action understanding  
(p. 172) [1]. However, these authors, 
and the field generally, have failed 
to notice that other forms of mirror 
actions are in the macaque motor 
repertoire. For example, field studies 
show that rhesus monkeys perceive 
human gestures as goal-directed, 
including those that mimic the rhesus 
monkeys’ species-specific signal for 
coalition recruitment [5]. Macaques 
also engage in contagious yawning, 
where perception of another’s yawn 
triggers a yawn in the observer [6]. 
Further, experimental work has found 
that another’s grasping actions toward 
one of two food receptacles serves 
as a cue to goal-directed grasping 
toward that same receptacle [7] — an 
experimental situation reminiscent 
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It is hard to imagine a class of 
neurons that has generated more 
excitement than mirror neurons, 
cells discovered by Rizzolatti and 
colleagues [1] in macaque area F5 
that fire both during action execution 
and action observation. We suggest, 
however, that the interpretation 
of mirror neurons as supporting 
action understanding was a wrong 
turn at the start, and that a more 
appropriate interpretation was lying 
in wait with respect to sensorimotor 
learning. We make a number of 
arguments, as follows. Given their 
previous work, it would have been 
natural for Rizzolatti’s group to 
interpret mirror neurons as involved 
in action selection rather than action 
understanding. They did not make this 
assumption because, at the time, the 
data suggested that monkey behavior 
did not support such an interpretation. 
Recent evidence shows that monkeys 
do, in fact, exhibit behaviors that 
support this alternative interpretation. 
Thus, the original basis for claiming 
that mirror neurons mediate 
action understanding is no longer 
compelling. There are independent 
arguments against the action 
understanding claim and in support 
of a sensorimotor learning origin 
for mirror neurons. Therefore, the 
action understanding theory of mirror 
neuron function requires serious 
reconsideration, if not abandonment.
Mirror neurons were discovered 
in the context of research aimed 
at understanding how the visual 
properties of objects are integrated 
with motor codes for action. Cells 
in area F5 were found to respond to 
visually presented objects as well 
as during grasping actions towards 
those objects. The interpretation 
of this circuit was that it coded a 
“vocabulary of motor acts and that 
this vocabulary can be accessed by … 
visual stimuli” (p. 491) [2] and that it 
was critical for “learning associations, 
including arbitrary associations 
between stimuli and [motor] schemas” 
(p. 317) [3]. This is a “‘pragmatic’ 
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of the mirror neuron studies. Even 
domesticated dogs mirror goal-
directed actions of a model dog 
[8]; one would expect to find mirror 
neurons in dogs given this behavioral 
evidence. And lastly, rhesus monkeys 
comprehend actions that they are 
physically incapable of producing. In 
particular, though rhesus monkeys 
do not throw, they can recognize a 
throwing action in humans, realizing 
that throwing a rock is dangerous 
whereas throwing food is not [5].
Observed actions can serve as 
important inputs to action selection, 
including, but not necessarily 
limited to, mirror actions. Therefore, 
the motivating argument for the 
action understanding theory over a 
sensorimotor theory (for example [9]) 
does not hold.
Can we distinguish the sensorimotor 
and action understanding theories 
of mirror neurons? Yes: empirical 
findings favor the sensorimotor 
account by showing that action 
understanding and motor system 
function dissociate [10], that motor 
actions alone are insufficient to 
explain action understanding [5], that 
animals comprehend many actions 
that they cannot execute [10], and that 
sensorimotor learning can transform 
the mirror system [9]. 
In summary, a sensorimotor theory 
can explain the response properties 
of mirror neurons, does so more 
straightforwardly, and does not 
suffer the empirical roadblocks of the 
action understanding theory [5,10]. 
It is time to reconsider mirror neuron 
function and the neural basis of action 
understanding.
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Figure 1. Schematic models of dorsal and ventral stream function. 
(A) The current dominant model [1], which holds that object- and action-oriented processes 
for sensorimotor integration and ‘understanding’ are organized differentially, with action un-
derstanding part of the dorsal sensorimotor stream and object ‘understanding’ part of the 
ventral stream. (B) A more conventional model in which object- and action-oriented processes 
for sensory-motor integration and understanding are organized similarly. Both models assume 
that semantic information from the ventral stream can modulate sensorimotor processes in the 
dorsal stream.
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